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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration on product position, product variety 
and readership in markets for daily newspapers.  US antitrust policy presumes that mergers 
reduce the amount and diversity of content available to consumers.  However, the effects of 
consolidation in differentiated product markets cannot be determined solely from theory.  
Because multi-product firms internalize business stealing, mergers may encourage firms to 
reposition products, leading to more, not less, variety.  Using data on reporter assignments from 
1993-1999, results show that differentiation and variety increase with concentration.  Moreover, 
there is evidence that additional variety increases readership, suggesting that concentration 
benefits consumers. 
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Introduction 
Regulation of media markets in the U.S. historically emphasized content and content 
variety rather than consumer or advertiser prices.  This focus accompanies a strong presumption 
that larger numbers of owners and products in a market lead to better outcomes.  Limits on the 
number of radio stations in a market owned by a single firm, protection of newspaper joint 
operating agreements, a prohibition against cross-ownership of broadcast and print media 
products in a market, and active antitrust enforcement against newspaper mergers all attest to this 
presumption.1   
Yet, it is far from obvious that more owners give rise to greater variety.  Media markets 
offer differentiated products produced with large fixed costs and advertiser finance.  It is well 
known that such markets can deliver too much, or too little, variety.2  Duplication can arise if 
revenue from capturing only a fraction of one consumer type covers fixed costs (Steiner, 1952).  
At the same time, markets can fail to provide specialized coverage when advertising revenue 
obtained from targeting a particular group is less than the cost of developing new content 
(Spence and Owen, 1977).  Because multi-product firms internalize business-stealing 
externalities, mergers can lead owners to eliminate duplicative products and change the content 
of others.  Various production economies, as well as higher revenues, brought about by 
consolidation can also make new content viable.  The effect of ownership concentration on 
content variety is therefore an empirical question.   
                                                 
1 Restrictions on radio station ownership were relaxed significantly by the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.    
 
2 The tendency for differentiated product markets to produce too much or too little variety is considered in 
Spence (1976a, 1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
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This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration on product position, product 
variety, and readership in markets for daily newspapers.  Newspapers provide a useful setting for 
studying the effects of concentration on variety for several reasons.  First, policy interest in 
newspapers and newspaper content in particular demonstrate the importance of understanding 
factors that lead to greater variety.  Second, high fixed costs and other aspects of newspaper 
production limit to a handful the number of products available in any market, raising the 
consequences of positioning decisions by individual firms.3  Newspaper owners also appear to 
have little scope for price discrimination that might otherwise allow for provision of content 
demanded by small groups.4  Finally, the 1990’s saw a sharp increase in newspaper mergers and 
acquisitions, driven in part by exogenous policy changes.  This consolidation wave aids 
empirical investigation of the effect of concentration on variety. 
This study uses newspaper-level information on the assignment of reporters and editors to 
approximately 150 different topical reporting beats in 1993 and 1999 to characterize the 
separation between products and amount of content variety available in 207 newspaper markets.  
Using a simple distance formula to measure the degree of differentiation in coverage among 
papers in each market at the beginning of the consolidation wave and six years later, results show 
that a decrease in the number of owners in a market leads to an increase in separation between 
products.  Moreover, the number of topical reporting beats covered per market also increases 
                                                 
3 See Reddaway (1963) and Rosse (1970) for background on the cost structure of the newspaper industry.  
Advertising accounts for about 80% of newspaper revenue.  For estimates in the literature see Compaine (1980, 
1982) and Picard (1988).  The Newspaper Association of America’s Facts about Newspapers (2000) reports 
circulation revenue for daily and Sunday papers at $10.5 billion and advertising revenue at $46.2 billion.  See 
www.naa.org/info/facts00.  On average, about 8 newspapers and 6 owners operate per market in the US.  
 
4 According to data in Burrelle’s Media Directory, the primary data source for this study, there is little 
variation in newspaper prices, with more than 75% of daily newspapers selling at $.50 in 1999.  Burrelle’s data also 
reveal no relationship between prices and content variety, as measured by the total number of reporting beats 
covered by the paper.  High fixed costs also seem to make the proliferation of tailored content through specialized 
newspapers very costly, since only the largest markets can support legal, industry, or business dailies. 
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with ownership concentration.  Finally, there is evidence that the additional coverage brought 
about by consolidation increases readership.  Although policy may be concerned with aspects of 
diversity beyond the number of topics covered by newspapers, these results suggest that from the 
standpoint of variety, increased concentration does not harm readers.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 reviews the policy and theory that motivate the 
study.  Section 2 examines the relevant literature.  Section 3 outlines the data and content 
measures used in the analyses.  Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and Section 5 presents 
results.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
1.  Motivation 
U.S. antitrust policy toward newspapers and regulation of media markets focuses 
generally on content rather than consumer or advertiser prices.  Recent antitrust actions against 
newspaper mergers and acquisitions in Arkansas, Hawaii, and California are all based on the 
premise that more papers and more owners in a market lead to greater variety and diversity of 
content.5  In Arkansas, the Department of Justice argued that despite their location in different 
cities, competition between the Northwest Arkansas Times and the Morning News of Northwest 
Arkansas led publishers to introduce new content that benefited readers.6  In Hawaii, the 
                                                 
5 In Arkansas, see in particular U.S. request for oral argument, U.S. v. NAT, L.C. 139 F.3d 1180 (1998).  In 
Hawaii, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States of America in Support of Appellee State of Hawaii and 
Affirmance, State of Hawaii v. Gannett Pacific Corp. 203 F.3d 832 (1999) and State of Hawaii v. Gannett Pacific 
Corp. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (1999).  A brief outline of antitrust concerns in the Hearst case can be found in 
Department of Justice press release “Hearst Corp. To Sell San Francisco Examiner to ExIn LLC, Resolves Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Concerns,” March 30, 2000, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr. 
 
6 See U.S. request for oral argument, U.S. v. NAT, L.C. 139 F.3d 1180 (1998).  In its appellate 
brief the DOJ describes the nature of competition between the papers:  “The Times increased its use of 
color, and the Morning News responded with additional use of color (GX 19 at TC 004827, GA 212). Smith 
distributed free copies of the Times to Morning News readers on holidays (GX 99 at NAT08-00101, A 632; 
GX 44, GA 215). After the Times did so in Springdale, the Morning News switched to 365-days a year 
publication (GX 45, GA 216; T. 1251-53, GA 146-48). The Morning News followed the Times in 
introducing a travel page (GX 119 at NAT07-00080, GA 282), and the Times, in turn, improved its weather 
page in response to  similar improvements by the Morning News (GX 231, GA 346). Perhaps most visibly, 
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Department argued on appeal that early termination of a joint operating agreement allowing the 
Honolulu Star-Bulletin to close would adversely affect news content in the market.  Quoting a 
lower court ruling, the Department argued:   
[N]o monetary amount will be able to compensate for the loss of the Star-
Bulletin's editorial and reportorial voice, the elimination of a significant forum for 
the airing of ideas and thoughts, the elimination of an important source of 
democratic expression, and the removal of a significant facet by which news is 
disseminated in the community.7 
In California, antitrust concerns about a transaction that would allow the Hearst 
Corporation, owner of the San Francisco Examiner, to buy the San Francisco Chronicle were 
related similarly to the effect of ownership concentration on newspaper content.8  Federal 
Communication Commission regulations prohibiting cross-ownership of newspapers and radio 
stations in the same market are also based on maintaining diversity.9  
Despite the concern that newspaper mergers and acquisitions reduce the amount of 
content available to consumers, several features of newspaper markets make theoretical 
predictions about the effects ownership concentration unclear.  Because differentiated products 
are somewhat substitutable for one another, they tend to divert or “steal” business from each 
other.  With atomistic ownership and fixed costs, there can be a tendency for duplicative 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Times expanded its sports coverage in order to “rattle the [Morning] News' cage” (GX 26 at TC 001961, 
PA 829), and the Morning News responded by enhancing its  own sports coverage (GX 129, at NAT07-
00048, GA 314).  . . . In sum, as a Morning News official put it, competition in the region was ‘a ferocious 
dog eat dog situation.’   (PX 39 at DONR-10708, GA 361).”    
 
7 Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States of America in Support of Appellee State of Hawaii and 
Affirmance, State of Hawaii v. Gannett Pacific Corp. 203 F.3d 832 (1999).   The appellate brief quotes the district 
court ruling, State of Hawaii v. Gannett Pacific Corp. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (1999).  
 
8 See Department of Justice press release “Hearst Corp. To Sell San Francisco Examiner to ExIn LLC, 
Resolves Justice Department’s Antitrust Concerns,” March 30, 2000, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr. 
 
9 See 50 FCC 2d at 1074.  According to the FCC, rules prohibiting ownership of newspapers and radio 
stations in the same market are based on “the twin goals of promoting diversity of viewpoints and economic 
competition.”  The Commission is currently considering changes to the rule.  See FCC-00-191, 1998 Biennial 
Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to 
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
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products.10  Joint production of multiple products, sometimes brought about by mergers, 
internalizes this business-stealing externality.  A newspaper owner who acquires a local 
competitor’s paper similar to his own would likely not continue to operate both papers in their 
previous forms.  Rather, the owner would either differentiate them by altering their content, or 
close one of the papers altogether.  Differentiation might take the form of simply eliminating 
duplicative content from one paper, replacing duplicative content with new material, or shifting 
emphasis among reporting topics.  In closing one of the papers, the owner might add content to 
the remaining product to prevent competitor entry into a formerly viable niche.  If the acquisition 
allowed the owner to increase advertising revenue per reader, the owner might also introduce 
content previously unavailable in the market.11  Hence even mergers that reduce the number of 
newspapers would not necessarily reduce content variety.  The effect of ownership concentration 
on variety is an empirical question. 
Although theory alone cannot predict the effects of concentration, empirical tests are 
complicated by the need for exogenous changes in ownership concentration.  While there has 
been no single major reform in newspaper ownership rules in recent years, the 1990’s saw 
considerable increases in ownership concentration across markets driven in part by exogenous 
factors.  Figure 1 shows the number of newspaper acquisitions each year since 1980.  In all but 
                                                 
10 This is one of the possibilities outlined theoretically by Spence (1976a,1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977).  See Berry and Waldfogel (1999) for empirical evidence from another media industry, radio broadcasting. 
 
11 Although the prediction that multi-product firms seek to separate products is unambiguous, there has 
been disagreement in the theoretical literature as to whether total product variety ever increases with concentration.  
In media markets, duplication arises if advertising revenue from capturing only a fraction of one consumer type 
covers fixed production costs (Steiner, 1952).  Beebe (1977) points out that a monopolist would eliminate 
duplication but would have no incentive to replace it with new content.  The monopolist’s decision to produce 
content is considered in Anderson and Coate (2000).  In their model of broadcast markets, although a monopolist 
resists adding content that would lower consumption of existing products, the fact that the monopolist can earn more 
revenues per program creates an incentive to generate new content.  The dominant effect depends on programming 
costs, the value of consumers to advertisers, the nuisance cost of advertising, and the substitutability of products.  
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one case the number of newspapers changing hands each year since 1993 has exceeded the 
number sold each year since 1980.  Unlike transactions in earlier decades, most transactions in 
the 1990s have been among ownership groups seeking geographic consolidation.12  Between the 
start of the boom in 1993 and 1999, the number of owners per market decreased by about 9% 
overall and close to 15% in the largest markets.13   
Figure 1:  Newspaper Acquisitions per Year, 1980-1999 
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The consolidation wave was fueled by regulatory changes in media ownership rules.  In 
1993 Congress eliminated restrictions on the FCC’s ability to amend rules prohibiting newspaper 
owners from operating broadcast stations in the same market.  In the same year, the FCC granted 
the first permanent waiver of newspaper cross-ownership rules to Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
                                                 
12 The fraction of independent newspapers (papers publishing in a single city) to all daily newspaper sold 
declined from 70% in 1985 to fewer than 10% in 1996.  Transaction details are taken from Dirks, Van Essen & 
Associates, “Near-Record Number of Daily Newspapers Sold in 1996,” Newspaper Acquisitions, Santa Fe, p. 2, 
1997 and Dirks, Van Essen & Associates, “Clustering:  Growing Regional Groups Retaining Readers as Industry 
Circulation Slips,” Newspaper Acquisitions, Santa Fe, p. 2, 1998.  Note that the 1986 spike is due to tax changes that 
induced many owners of independent newspapers to sell at that time.  
 
13 Concentration measures are calculated from data published in Burrelle's Media Directory, the primary 
data source for this study. 
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allowing cross-ownership of WNYW-TV and the New York Post.  The Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 relaxed limits on the number of jointly-owned radio stations that could be licensed per 
market, unleashing a wave of consolidation in radio that further altered incentives for media 
firms to own newspapers vis a vis broadcast products across markets.14   
2. Literature 
Although there is an extensive theoretical literature on the effects of concentration on 
product position and product variety, there is relatively little empirical evidence on the 
question.15  Most closely related to this study is Berry and Waldfogel (2001), which examines 
the effects of ownership concentration on programming variety in radio broadcasting.  They find 
that consolidation triggered by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 reduced entry but increased 
the number of radio formats broadcast both absolutely and relative to the number of stations.  
In addition to economic work, there is a substantial literature in sociology and 
communications that examines the relationship between ownership and content in media 
industries.16  Much of the work on newspapers focuses on differences between papers published 
by chains and those published by independent owners, with few clear, robust results.  Lacy 
(1991), one of the more extensive studies in this literature, finds that chain-owned papers contain 
                                                 
14 For background on FCC cross-ownership restrictions for newspapers see FCC-00-191, 1998 Biennial 
Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to 
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.   For information on how changes in broadcasting affect 
newspapers, see Emergency Petition for Relief of The Newspaper Association of America, August 23,1999, available 
at www.naa.org/ppolicy/govt/fccpetition.  Economic growth in retail sales beginning in the early 1990’s also created 
incentives for newspaper consolidation.  Since retail advertising constitutes about one half of all newspaper 
advertising revenue, market power in the supply of advertising becomes particularly attractive in active retail 
markets.  For a general discussion of the relationship between competition and advertising see Becker and Murphy 
(1993).   
 
15 Hotelling (1929) provides a foundation for the literature on product positioning.  Spence (1976a, 1976b) 
and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) form the basis of the theoretical literature on product variety.  
 
16  See Compaine (1995) for a useful review of the communications literature on ownership and content.  
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shorter articles and devote less space to news and editorial beats than independently owned 
papers, but that they also devote more staff resources for a given allocation of space.  Hicks and 
Featherstone (1978) find evidence that newspapers under common ownership tend to produce 
less overlapping content.  Another branch of this literature examines the effect of ownership 
structure on political endorsements, again with conflicting results.17  While most of these studies 
consider small samples with cross-sectional data, they highlight a long-standing concern with 
ownership and content reflected in public policy.  Because of the close relationship between 
newspapers and political information, the effects of ownership concentration on content are of 
interest to a wider audience than might otherwise be the case. 
This paper also builds on a substantial literature on the industrial organization of media 
markets generally and the effects of concentration in particular.  Early papers by Reddaway 
(1963) and Rosse (1970) establish the importance of fixed costs in newspaper production.  
Chaudhri (1998) and Blair and Romano (1993) examine the pricing decisions of a newspaper 
monopolist earning revenues from circulation and advertising.  Both find that features of the 
newspaper market can lead to lower consumer prices with monopoly ownership.  Empirically, 
Bucklin, Caves, and Lo (1989) find no evidence of a relationship between concentration and 
circulation or advertising prices, although Reimer (1992) provides evidence from a very small 
(35 city) sample that concentration may lead to lower prices for advertisers.  Dertouzos and 
Trautman (1990) examine the effect of concentration on firm costs, finding no clear evidence of 
scale economies from consolidation.  A final line of research uses newspaper firms as an avenue 
for the study of technology adoption and diffusion (Dertouzos and Quinn,1985; and Genesove, 
1999). 
                                                 
17 Studies of chain ownership and political bias are numerous.  See Akhavan-Majid et al. (1991), Gaziano 
(1989), Olien et al. (1988) and Busterna and Hansen (1990). 
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3.  Data Sources and Content Measures 
3.1 Data Overview 
The basic data set used in this study is a newspaper-level panel identifying the topical 
beat assignments of reporters and editors at about 1,500 daily newspapers for the years 1993 and 
1999.  Data from 1995 are also available and used in some specifications. The data also include 
the owner of each newspaper and total circulation in each year.  Newspaper data are 
supplemented with zip code-level newspaper circulation, population data from the 1990 census, 
and retail concentration measures from the 1997 economic census.  The distribution of reporters 
across beats is used to construct market-level measures of product differentiation and content 
variety for 207 designated market areas (DMA’s) each year.18 
Newspaper reporter data come from the 1994, 1996, and 2000 editions of Burrelle’s 
Media Director with data reported in 1993, 1995, and 1999.19  The 2000 edition of the directory 
maps the job title of about 30,000 reporters and editors (e.g., “Travel Editor”) into about 150 
topical reporting beats.  Data from 1994 and 1996 report job titles only, which are linked 
individually to beat codes in the 2000 Directory.  Zip code-level circulation data are taken from 
the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) Circulation Data Bank (1999).  ABC is a membership 
organization that sets standards for reporting newspaper circulation and audits publisher 
                                                 
18 Designated Market Areas (DMA’s) are delineated by Nielsen Media Research and commonly used by 
media firms in measuring market participation and compiling consumer demographics for advertisers.  DMA’s 
generally correspond to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s) used in census reporting.  However DMA’s cover 
virtually all of the United States, unlike MSA’s which exclude rural areas. 
 
19 Burrelle’s Media Directory is a product of Burrelle’s Information Services, a media monitoring 
organization that publishes directories and broadcast transcripts, disseminates news clippings, and performs a range 
of public relations and advertising support functions related to media monitoring. 
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statements for use by advertisers. The data reflect paid newspaper sales at newsstands, by home 
delivery, and by mail for 1995 and 1999.20 
3.2 Variety, Differentiation, and Concentration Measures 
An ideal measure of content variety would reflect the number and types of articles 
published across newspapers over time.  Although studies using such output measures are 
common in the communications literature, the difficulty of assembling data from individual 
newspapers typically leads to cross-sectional analyses with very small samples in few reporting 
categories.21  The basic measure of content variety used in this paper, which allows for more 
complete characterization of coverage over time using a comprehensive set of daily papers, is the 
number of different topical beats covered by reporters and editors in a market.  Although reporter 
assignments reflect inputs rather than outputs, the notion that more variety in reporter 
assignments corresponds to more variety in coverage is highly intuitive.  Does a market have a 
travel editor or not?  A music critic?  A political analyst?  The presence or absence of coverage 
in a particular topical area is directly related to choices available to readers and hence constitutes 
a reasonable measure of content variety.22    
                                                 
 
20 To maintain comparability between Burrelle’s and ABC data, foreign-language, industry, and national 
newspapers such as USA Today, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Wall Street Journal are not included in the 
sample.   
 
21 Content analysis is widely used to study both the amount of coverage in particular areas as well 
qualitative features of this coverage.   Typical examples are Coulson and Lacy (1998) for newspapers and Hillve, 
Majanel, and Rosengren (1997) for television. 
  
22 Beat assignments might also be interpreted as the level of expertise brought to bear on a given news item.  
The presence or absence of, say, an environmental reporter affects the amount of environmental coverage in a paper.  
The presence of such a reporter might also improve the quality of coverage of an environmental story that is 
sufficiently newsworthy to warrant coverage by many papers, whether or not they have an environmental reporter.  
Although the focus here is on the former effect, both work in the same direction. 
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Using reporter assignments to measure content variety raises two concerns regarding the 
link between inputs and outputs.  First, Burrelle’s assigns reporters to about 150 highly-specific 
topical beats.  With this degree of specificity, reporter assignments might overstate content 
variety if, for example, a general business editor at a small paper reported on both banking and 
international trade while the fields were covered by separate reporters at a larger paper.  To 
mitigate potential bias that may be introduced by misconstruing specialization as variety, 
reporter assignments are aggregated to a set of about 50 consolidated categories.23  Results in 
Section 5 are presented for both the entire beat set and for consolidated beats.  Second, Burrelle’s 
data include reporter assignments to non-editorial beats such as classifieds, research, and 
graphics.  The link between beat assignments and content is less direct in these non-editorial 
areas.  However, staff assignments in these fields reflect the emphasis of the paper and hence 
bear directly on product positioning.  To capture such differences in emphasis while focusing on 
the most meaningful beats, results presented for all beat categories include non-editorial beats 
and results for consolidated beats do not.   
Figure 2 shows the average number of reporters per paper assigned to each consolidated 
beat.  Figure 3 shows the percentage of markets in which each beat is covered in 1993 and 1999.  
General news, sports, national news, entertainment, and opinion are the largest beats covered in 
all markets by virtually all papers.  Topics such as business, food, fashion, and travel are also 
                                                 
23 Another way to reduce biases that might result from overlapping beat categories is to eliminate 
columnists and reporters from the underlying beat data and measure content variety and differentiation only on the 
beat assignments of editorial staff.  The effect is similar to consolidation in that editors cover fewer and more 
general beats than are covered in the combined reporter and editor data.  (Markets at the 95th percentile cover 55 
beats with editors only in 1999 as opposed to 71 beats and 47 consolidated beats with reporters and editors.)  
Editorial assignments also appear to be more consistent over time and across papers, likely reducing error or bias 
that might occur if newspapers with different characteristics use different criteria for categorizing writers or if the 
degree of inclusion has changed over time.  In practice, results using only editorial staff are quite similar to results 
for consolidated beats and are therefore not presented.   
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available in most markets although only at about 20-25% of papers. 24  Computing, gardening, 
and science reporting are more specialized:  coverage is available only in a few percent of papers 
in about half of the markets.  Specialized industry coverage, arts, and multicultural reporting are 
produced only by a small number of reporters in the very largest markets.  No clear trends in 
coverage are apparent from the graph.  Several new beats appear in 1999, such as fine art and 
multicultural reporting, but the fraction of markets covering more common beats such as banking 
and consumer affairs declines.  The full list of beats is provided in the appendix.  
 
Figure 2:  Average Reporters per Newspaper, Consolidated Beats (1999) 
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24 Figure 2 shows the total number of reporters assigned to each topic divided by the total number of 
newspapers in the samp le, hence the figure may be interpreted as the average number of reporters per paper or the 
fraction of papers with a single reporter assigned to the topic.  Reporters and editors are often assigned to more than 
one beat.  In these cases beat assignments are calculated proportionally so that a reporter assigned to entertainment 
and news would be counted as one half of one reporter in each category.  
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It is also interesting to explore the differences between large and small papers.  Figure 4 
shows the allocation of reporters to beats at the smallest 20% and largest 20% of daily 
newspapers.  Staff allocations differ significantly, with small papers devoting a much larger 
fraction of resources to basic topics such as general news, sports, and classifieds.  Larger papers 
assign a greater fraction of reporters to specialty topics such as food, literature, real estate, and 
politics.  These differences suggest that, to the extent mergers and acquisitions produce larger 
papers, the number of topics covered may increase. 
Figure 3:  Percent of Markets Covered, Consolidated Beats (1993, 1999) 
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Figure 4:  Top Beat Shares at Large and Small Papers, 1999 
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In addition to measuring content variety on an absolute scale, the distribution of reporters 
is used to compute a measure of the distance between, or differentiation among, products in each 
market.  The change in the measure following consolidation captures whether or not mergers 
induce firms to spread products apart in product space.  For markets with two papers, the 
measure is simply half the Euclidean distance between them.  In markets with more than two 
papers, it is the average distance to the mean assignment: 
 
1
1
( ) ( )
P
i i
i
d s s s s
P =
¢= - -å  
where ( )1 2, , ,i i i iBs s s s= K , sib  is the share of reporters assigned to beat b at paper i, P is the total 
number of papers in the market, and s  is a vector identifying the average share of reporters 
assigned to each beat across all papers in a market.25 
To illustrate the intuition behind the distance measure, consider two markets with two 
papers assigning reporters to Sports, News, and Entertainment.  In the first market, assume that 
both papers assign one reporter to each beat.  In the second market, consider the case where one 
newspaper assigns one reporter to each beat and the other assigns two reporters to sports and one 
to news.  Differentiation in the first market is zero.  In the second market, the average share of 
reporters assigned to Sports, News, and Entertainment is ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
6
1
,
3
1
,
2
1
.  Differentiation in the 
                                                 
25 This type of multi-attribute distance measure is most often found in utility specifications for 
differentiated products such as in Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1989).     
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market is then:  
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.26   
The primary independent variable in the paper is ownership concentration, measured as 
the absolute number of owners in a market and as the number of “owner-equivalents.”  The 
number of owner-equivalents is the inverse of the Herfindahl index, defined as the inverse 
squared sum of ownership market shares, 
2
1
1
O
o
o
sh
=
å
 , where sho is the share of owner o in a market.  
(Newspaper equivalents are similarly calculated with newspaper rather than ownership shares.)  
When owners in a market are equal in terms of circulation, the number of owner-equivalents is 
equal to the number of owners.  When circulation is not equal across owners, the number of 
owner-equivalents is less than the number of owners.   In general, owner-equivalents are a better 
measure of concentration in markets where circulation shares are not equal across firms.  For this 
study, however, using the absolute number of owners provides some advantages.  In particular, 
the number of owner-equivalents depends on newspaper circulation, which is measured with 
considerably more error than the number of owners or papers in these data.27 Also, because of its 
                                                 
26 The distance measure could also be calculated based on the number rather than fraction of reporters and 
editors assigned to each beat.  Results are substantively similar to fraction results and are not presented.  More direct 
measures of exclusivity such as the number or fraction of beats in a market covered by a single paper are also 
possible.  Again, results are consistent with those shown and are not presented.  Note that 18 of the markets in the 
sample include only one paper.  Measured distance is zero in these markets in both 1993 and 1999.  Because 
markets with a single daily paper have seen no ownership changes, the zeros do not affect estimated coefficients.  
Their effect on standard errors is also very small. 
 
27 Specifically, Burrelle’s does not disaggregate circulation of each newspaper within and outside the home 
market and therefore tends to overstate market circulation.  Data available from the Audit Bureau of Circulations 
allows calculation of in-market and out-of-market circulation for some papers.  The ratio of out-of-market 
circulation to total circulation ranges from zero to more than 40%.  For example, out-of-market circulation is about 
-17- 
dependence on circulation, the number of owner-equivalents in a market changes even when the 
number of owners does not, introducing further error into the study of ownership changes.  
Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
  N Mean SD 5%  25%  50%  75%  95%  
Newspaper Statistics (1993)         
Beats Covered 1630 15.40 9.21 3 7 11 19 35 
Consolidated Beats Covered 1630 13.82 8.45 3 7 12 19 31 
         
Newspaper Statistics (1999)         
Beats Covered 1546 14.37 11.01 4 8 13 21 35 
Consolidated Beats Covered 1546 12.62 8.65 3 6 10 17 31 
         
Market Statistics (1993)         
Beats Covered 207 32.53 10.43 14 25 34 42 45 
Consolidated Beats Covered 207 28.99 8.79 13 23 30 37 39 
Total Staff 207 82.60 78.87 14 31 60 105 238 
Owners  207 6.14 4.90 1 3 4 9 16 
Owner-equivalents  207 2.77 1.64 1.00 1.64 2.32 3.43 6.39 
Papers 207 7.87 7.15 1 3 5 11 23 
Paper Equivalents 207 3.24 2.06 1.00 1.81 2.75 4.08 7.10 
Distance — All Beats 207 18.04 7.11 0.00 15.99 18.85 22.01 26.56 
Distance — Consolidated Beats 207 1.58 0.78 0.00 27.72 42.31 57.12 78.51 
Per Capita Newspaper Sales (1995) 196 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.26 
   
Market Statistics (1999)         
Beats Covered 207 35.47 17.93 13 23 33 41 71 
Consolidated Beats Covered 207 28.82 10.52 11 21 30 36 47 
Total Staff 207 98.54 134.64 12 27 52 110 308 
Owners  207 5.57 4.09 1 3 4 8 14 
Owner-equivalents  207 2.60 1.45 1 1.57 2.24 3.19 5.62 
Papers 207 7.47 6.41 1 3 5 10 22 
Paper Equivalents 207 3.06 1.92 1 1.77 2.52 3.90 6.62 
Distance — All Beats 207 20.17 7.66 0.00 15.99 18.85 22.01 26.56 
Distance — Consolidated Beats 207 1.79 0.87 0.00 31.88 45.39 61.33 88.38 
Per Capita Newspaper Sales  196 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.25 
                                                                                                                                                             
3% for the Philadelphia Inquirer, about 9% for the Washington Post, 11% for the San Francisco Chronicle and 19% 
for the Des Moines Register.  
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Table 1 summarizes product-level beat data as well as market-level measures of variety, 
product separation, and ownership concentration in 1993 and 1999.  The number of papers drops 
from 1,630 to 1,546 in the same markets over the time period of the study.  The average daily 
paper covers about 15 beats.  The smallest papers cover about five reporting beats and the largest 
about 35.  The means for consolidated beats are somewhat lower than for the disaggregated 
beats.  At the market level, the number of beats covered ranges from about 14 at the 5th 
percentile to more than 70 at the 95th percentile.  With consolidated beats, total content variety 
ranges from about 13 at the 5th percentile to about 45 at the 95th percentile.28  The average 
number of owners per market each year is about 6, with the number of owner-equivalents about 
3.  The average number of papers is approximately 8 in both years, with the number of paper 
equivalents also about 3.  The mean distance among papers in a market is 20 for total beats and 2 
for consolidated beats. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The goal of the empirical analyses is to measure the effect of ownership concentration on 
the separation among papers and the number of topical beats covered in a newspaper market.  An 
empirical approach commonly employed in the communications literature is to regress each 
market attribute on the number of owners and observable market characteristics such as 
population, income, and education.29  Although cross-sectional analyses can in some cases be 
informative, this approach is vulnerable to the concern that unobserved differences across 
markets affect both product differentiation and variety, which could bias results.  
                                                 
28 Recall that reporters and editors are often assigned to more than one beat.  This allows the number of 
beats covered in a market to exceed the number of reporters. 
 
29 Cross-sectional methods are common.  See, for example, Hicks and Featherstone (1978) and Akhavan-
Majid et al. (1991).  
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The primary method pursued in this study, which avoids these problems, is estimation 
with longitudinal data and market fixed effects.  With observations at two points in time, a 
dummy variable can be added to the regressions for each market.  The effect of concentration on 
variety is then identified from the relationship between changes in concentration and changes in 
variety.  If unobserved preferences for newspaper content across markets remain constant over 
time, this approach produces unbiased estimates of the effect of changes in the number of owners 
or owner-equivalents on changes in differentiation or variety.  All of the relationships explored 
in Section 5 are estimated using market fixed effects. 
Although the overall burst of acquisition activity that began in 1993 was driven by 
exogenous regulatory and market factors, ownership changes across markets may themselves be 
endogenously related to preferences for newspaper content.30  To address this concern, it is 
useful to identify an instrument for changes in the number of owners.  Such an instrument would 
need to be correlated with changes in ownership and uncorrelated with changes in preferences.  
One candidate for an instrument is population, since small markets with very few papers simply 
have less scope for consolidation than larger markets.  Another candidate for an instrument is the 
amount of retail competition in the market.  Local retail advertising constitutes about 45% of all 
newspaper advertising.  If demand for newspaper advertising increases with retail competition, 
market power in the supply of advertising should be more valuable in more competitive retail 
                                                 
30 If acquired newspapers differ systematically from newspapers that do not change hands, selection effects 
may bias both fixed effects and instrumental variables estimates.  For example, if acquired papers are less financially 
sound than others, an increase in the number of topics covered after acquisition may reflect changes in management 
rather than concentration.  Newspaper-level financial data that would allow general tests for selection effects are not 
available.  However, this specific concern can be studied by regressing the absolute and percentage change in 
circulation and variety over the period 1993-1995 on a dummy variable equal to one for the 98 newspapers that 
changed hands in 1996 and zero otherwise.  Insignificant coefficient estimates on the dummy variable in regressions 
with and without a market fixed effect indicate that papers changing owners in 1996 experienced no loss in 
circulation or variety between 1993 and 1995 relative to papers with a single owner over this period.  
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markets.31  Both population levels and the amount of retail competition should be uncorrelated 
with changes in preferences for newspaper coverage.32   
Market population is generated by aggregating zip code-level population data from the 
1990 Census to the DMA level.  Measures of retail competitiveness can be constructed from data 
in the 1997 Census of Business, which reports total sales by retail category by county.  The 
inverse of the Herfindahl index across retail categories produces an estimate of the number of 
“retail-equivalents” in a market.  This measure of retail concentration should be related to the 
level of competition.33   
Table 2 summarizes ownership, differentiation and variety measures in 1993 and 1999 by 
population quintile and by quintiles of retail-equivalents.  The data suggest that the number of 
owners and owner-equivalents has dropped across all market segments, but the drop has been 
more pronounced in larger markets and markets with a less concentrated retail sector.  The 
relationship appears to be more consistent across population quintiles than retail quintiles.  The 
change in content variety is also higher in larger markets and markets with less retail 
concentration.  As expected, the total amount of content variety is also much greater in big 
markets.  Markets in the top population quintile publish about twice as many beats as smaller 
                                                 
31 Newspaper advertising shares are reported in the Newspaper Association of America’s, Facts about 
Newspapers (2000), available at www.naa.org/info/facts00/09.  See Becker and Murphy (1993) for a general 
discussion of the relationship between competition and advertising.  
 
32 Changes in population, however, might be correlated with changes in preferences.  Robustness checks on 
results consider the effects of population changes using population estimates from Claritas, a marketing firm that 
compiles product, industry and demographic data.  See notes in Section 5. 
    
 33 Specifically, the number of retail-equivalents in a market is defined as the inverse of the squared sales 
share in each retail category, å
=
=
N
i
isshReq
1
2 ,1  where ssh i is the retail sales share in category i  and N  is the total 
number of retail categories.  A better measure would estimate concentration at the establishment level, however the 
Census Bureau does not release data necessary for such a calculation.  The cross-category measures reflect sales in 
44 five-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes in the retail categories 442-446 and 
448-453.  Summary statistics for retail data are included in the appendix. 
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markets in 1993 and three times as many beats in 1999.  Markets in the top retail quintile publish 
in about 50% more beats than smaller markets in 1993 and about twice as many beats in 1999. 
Table 2:  Market Characteristics by Population and Retail Quintiles, 1993-1999 
Quintile DMA’s Pop 
(M) 
Retail 
Eq’s 
Owners 
 
Owner 
Eq’s 
Papers 
 
Paper 
Eq’s 
All 
Beats 
Combined 
Beats 
Distance 
All 
Beats 
Distance 
Combined 
Beats 
1993 - Population Quintiles 
1 42 0.16 3.78 1.93 1.56 2.26 1.77 19.48 17.95 11.52 18.50 
2 41 0.37 4.62 3.93 2.42 4.56 2.81 29.20 26.54 17.14 34.45 
3 42 0.64 5.94 4.98 3.00 6.10 3.45 34.12 30.43 19.29 42.08 
4 41 1.14 6.65 7.80 3.33 9.93 4.09 37.73 33.44 20.98 52.47 
5 41 3.73 7.65 12.17 3.57 16.71 4.10 42.39 36.83 21.41 62.71 
1999 - Population Quintiles 
1 42 0.16 3.78 1.90 1.52 2.19 1.70 18.74 17.02 13.39 21.17 
2 41 0.37 4.62 3.71 2.30 4.46 2.69 26.37 23.51 18.73 36.21 
3 42 0.64 5.94 4.79 2.90 5.81 3.22 32.52 28.76 20.81 44.15 
4 41 1.14 6.65 7.24 3.07 9.68 3.77 38.12 32.71 22.91 56.48 
5 41 3.73 7.65 10.34 3.22 15.37 3.95 62.07 42.37 25.17 73.86 
% Change 1993-1999 
1 42 - - -1.2% -2.3% -3.2% -3.8% -3.8% -5.2% 16.2% 14.5% 
2 41 - - -5.6% -4.9% -2.1% -4.5% -9.7% -11.4% 9.3% 5.1% 
3 42 - - -3.8% -3.5% -4.7% -6.6% -4.7% -5.5% 7.9% 4.9% 
4 41 - - -7.2% -7.9% -2.5% -7.9% 1.0% -2.2% 9.2% 7.6% 
5 41 - - -15.0% -9.8% -8.0% -3.7% 46.4% 15.0% 17.6% 17.8% 
1993 -  Retail Quintiles 
1 42 0.26 2.85 3.00 1.93 3.67 2.29 23.93 21.79 14.57 27.99 
2 41 0.52 4.72 4.02 2.37 4.80 2.78 29.07 26.24 16.55 32.33 
3 42 0.77 5.90 5.36 2.75 6.83 3.20 32.67 29.33 17.91 39.73 
4 41 1.31 6.80 7.56 3.27 9.54 3.73 36.73 32.41 20.56 52.45 
5 41 3.17 8.40 10.83 3.57 14.66 4.21 40.44 35.34 20.72 57.53 
1999 -  Retail Quintiles 
1 42 0.26 2.85 2.86 1.89 3.45 2.12 21.69 19.40 15.28 28.61 
2 41 0.52 4.72 3.83 2.30 4.78 2.72 28.44 25.17 19.58 37.78 
3 42 0.77 5.90 5.19 2.66 6.60 3.03 33.00 28.07 19.82 43.04 
4 41 1.31 6.80 7.07 3.04 9.32 3.52 40.59 33.71 22.35 55.54 
5 41 3.17 8.40 9.00 3.12 13.32 3.92 54.02 37.98 23.96 66.75 
% Change 1993-1999 
1 42 - - -4.8% -2.2% -5.8% -7.4% -9.4% -10.9% 4.9% 2.2% 
2 41 - - -4.8% -3.0% -0.5% -2.0% -2.2% -4.1% 18.3% 16.9% 
3 42 - - -3.1% -3.2% -3.5% -5.4% 1.0% -4.3% 10.6% 8.3% 
4 41 - - -6.5% -6.9% -2.3% -5.6% 10.5% 4.0% 8.7% 5.9% 
5 41 - - -16.9% -12.5% -9.2% -6.9% 33.6% 7.5% 15.7% 16.0% 
Notes:  Owner, paper and retail-equivalents calculated as the inverse Herfindahl index.  See text for details.  
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Table 3 presents the results of a regression of the change in the number of owners and the 
change in the number of owner-equivalents on market population and on the number of retail-
equivalents.  The coefficients on population and retail-equivalents are negative, confirming 
evidence in Table 2 that newspaper ownership concentration has increased the most in large 
markets and markets with more retail competition.  With both instruments, the amount of 
variation explained by the owner model is much higher than the model with owner-equivalents.34  
The population specification also explains variation in ownership changes better than the number 
of retail-equivalents.  Given these results, regressions in Section 5 present fixed effects estimates 
for both the number of owners and number of owner-equivalents and instrumental variables 
results only for the number of owners.   
Table 3:  Instruments for Changes in Ownership Concentration  
 D Owners 
(1993-99) 
D Owners 
Equivalents 
(1993-99) 
D Owners 
(1993-99) 
D Owners 
Equivalents 
(1993-99) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DMA Population (M) -0.676 -0.110   
 (7.82)** (2.11)*   
DMA Population Squared 0.019 0.005   
 (3.19)** (1.36)   
Retail-equivalents   -0.262 -0.066 
   (5.72)** (2.86)** 
Constant 0.151 -0.067 0.940 0.204 
 (1.39) (1.03) (3.39)** (1.46) 
Observations 207 207 207 207 
R-squared 0.39 0.03 0.14 0.04 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses (*p<.05, **p<.01).  Changes in owners, owner-equivalents 1993-1999 on 
population and retail-equivalents (levels).  Owner-equivalents and retail-equivalents calculated as the inverse 
Herfindahl index.  
 
                                                 
34 As noted in Section 3.2, a large amount of measurement error in Burelle’s circulation estimates is likely 
responsible for the limited explanatory power in regressions using owner-equivalents.  Note that it is also possible to 
instrument for the ownership Herfindahl directly, rather than equivalents, its inverse.  It turns out that the 
explanatory power with the Herfindahl is less than for the number of owner-equivalents and retail-equivalents and is 
not used.  
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5. Results 
This section proceeds in two parts.  The first examines the relationship between 
ownership concentration, product positioning, and product variety.  The second considers 
readership. 
5.1  Ownership Concentration, Product Positioning, and Product Variety 
Because multi-product firms are better able to internalize business-stealing, they want 
their papers to look different from each other and appeal to different readers.  One way that 
newspaper owners might differentiate products is to shift the allocation of reporters assigned to 
particular beats.  Recall from Section 3 that differences in emphasis among papers in a market 
can be measured as the average Euclidian distance among papers.  Table 4 shows the results of 
fixed-effects and instrumental variables regressions of changes in the distance measure on 
changes in the number of owners and owner-equivalents and on changes in the number of 
owners and papers.  The first two columns show the effect of an increase in owners and owner-
equivalents, the third column shows the effect of changes in owners and papers, and the fourth 
and fifth columns show the effect of changes in the number of owners using population and 
retail-equivalents as instruments for changes in owners.  Results are repeated for the complete set 
of reporting beats and for consolidated beats.  The relationship is always negative and virtually 
always significant, and the coefficient estimates are consistent across columns.  Overall, a 
decrease of one owner or owner-equivalent in the market leads to an increase in distance among 
papers by about 2-4%.  The number of newspapers has no effect.  Increased ownership 
concentration, regardless of the number of products, appears to increase the distance between 
products. 
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Table 4:  Does Ownership Concentration Increase Separation Among Papers? 
 Distance Among Papers, 1993-1999 
 All Beats Consolidated Beats 
 FE FE FE IV Pop IV Retail FE FE FE IV Pop IV Retail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Owners -0.60  -0.69 -0.79 -1.02 -1.73  -2.07 -3.36 -3.89 
 (2.95)**  (2.55)* (2.42)* (1.82) (2.87)**  (2.56)* (3.21)** (2.17)* 
Owner-equivalents  -0.66     -3.06    
  (1.46)     (2.30)*    
Papers   0.13     0.48   
   (0.52)     (0.63)   
Constant 22.63 20.89 22.16 1.68 1.55 54.23 52.30 52.53 2.42 2.13 
 (18.7)** (16.9)** (14.5)** (4.9)** (3.6)** (15.1)** (14.5)** (11.7)** (2.2)* (1.5) 
DMA’s 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses (*p<.05, **p<.01).  Regressions show distance among papers on owners, owner-equivalents, and papers.  Constants in FE 
regressions represent the average value of the DMA fixed effect.  IV regressions predict changes in owners with population and retail-equivalents (levels).  
Constants in IV regressions show average change in the independent variable. 
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Product positioning is interesting because predictions emerge directly from theory on 
firm behavior in differentiated product markets.  However the effect of concentration on the total 
amount of variety available in a market offers a more direct link to consumer welfare.  As a first 
step in examining the effect of ownership concentration on total product variety, it is useful to 
ask how an increase in concentration affects the number of papers in a market.  This is done by 
regressing changes in concentration measures on changes in the number of papers.  Table 5 
presents results.  The first column shows the relationship in terms of changes in the number of 
owners and papers and the second column shows the effect in terms of owner and paper 
equivalents.  The third and fourth columns show the effect of ownership changes using 
population and the number of retail-equivalents as instruments for the change in owners.  In each 
case, the relationship between owners and papers is positive and significant, suggesting that 
increased ownership concentration reduces the number of products available in a market.   
Table 5:  Does Ownership Concentration Reduce the Number of Newspapers?  
 Number of Daily Newspapers, 1993-1999 
 D Papers D Paper 
Equivalents  
D Papers D Papers 
 FE FE IV - Pop IV- Retail 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) 
D Owners 0.701  1.080 0.731 
 (11.73)**  (10.32)** (4.53)** 
D Owner-equivalents  0.835   
  (16.62)**   
Constant -0.013 -0.034 0.199 0.004 
 (0.15) (0.99) (1.84) (0.03) 
Observations 207 207 207 207 
R-squared 0.40 0.57 0.28 0.40 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses (*p<.05, **p<.01).  Changes in paper and paper-equivalents on changes in owners 
and owner-equivalents, 1993-1999. 
 
A decline in the number of products is a first-order effect that would be expected to 
decrease variety.  However, as discussed above, the full impact of concentration on variety 
depends on how owners alter products that remain in the market.  Turning to the primary 
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question, Table 6 shows the effect of changes in the number of owners and owner-equivalents on 
changes in the total number of reporting beats covered in a market.  The first three columns show 
the effect of changes in owners, owner-equivalents, and the number of papers using market fixed 
effects and the fourth and fifth columns show the effect of changes in owners on changes in 
variety using population and retail concentration as instruments for changes in owners.  The final 
five columns repeat the analyses using consolidated beats.  The coefficients on ownership 
measures are negative and significant in all but one case.  On average, the loss of one owner in a 
market increases the number of reporting beats covered by about 4 beats on a base of about 60 
total beats (an increase of about 6%).  The loss of one owner leads to an increase of 1 
consolidated beat on a base of 30 consolidated beats (an increase of about 3.3%).  Results using 
owner-equivalents show a slightly smaller effect on the number of beats covered.  Instrumental 
variables estimates are somewhat larger.35  Ownership concentration appears to increase the 
number of beats covered in a market.  
It is worth noting that the results in Table 6 are driven by changes in the number of 
owners.  The effect of changes in the number of papers on changes in the number of beats 
covered is negative for the total beat set, although the effect is smaller than the effect of owners.  
The effect of papers is negligible and insignificant for consolidated beats.  No strong conclusions 
can be drawn from this result.  However, it does suggest that mergers produce more total content 
when one paper closes than when both continue to operate.  Since operating multiple papers 
provides the opportunity to differentiate products through reporting emphasis as well as total 
content, the result is not unreasonable. 
                                                 
35 Checks on these results show that the magnitude and significance of the effect of changes in ownership 
concentration on changes in the number of beats covered in a market are robust to inclusion of market demographics 
(fraction educated, black, young, old) and estimated changes in population between 1990 and 1999.   
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Table 6:  Does Ownership Concentration Increase Content Variety? 
 Number of Reporting Beats Covered, 1993-1999 
 All Beats Consolidated Beats 
 FE FE FE IV Pop IV Retail FE FE FE IV Pop IV Retail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Owners -4.32  -3.35 -10.91 -9.70 -0.96  -0.97 -3.26 -3.27 
 (8.94)**  (5.23)** (9.69)** (5.54)** (3.75)**  (2.85)** (6.55)** (3.90)** 
Owner-equivalents  -2.607     -0.475    
  (2.11)*     (0.82)    
Papers   -1.386     0.025   
   (2.29)*     (0.08)   
Constant 59.34 40.99 64.26 -3.17 -2.49 34.53 30.17 34.44 -2.00 -2.01 
 (20.7)** (12.2)** (18.0)** (2.7)** (1.8) (22.8)** (19.2)** (18.0)** (3.8)** (3.1)** 
DMA’s 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses (*p<.05, **p<.01).  Regressions show beats covered on owners, owner-equivalents, and papers.  Constants in FE  regressions 
represent the average value of the DMA fixed effect.  IV regressions predict changes in owners with population and retail-equivalents (levels).  Constants in IV 
regressions show average change in the independent variable. 
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This increase in total content variety is surprising particularly in light of the result that an 
increase in concentration reduces the number of papers in a market, which, by itself, works 
against more variety.  The result suggests that multi-paper firms produce variety more 
efficiently, covering the same number of beats with fewer papers or more beats with the same 
number of papers.  This “efficiency effect” can be studied directly by examining the effect of 
changes in ownership concentration on changes in the total number of beats covered in a market 
divided by the number of papers.  Results are shown in Table 7.  The coefficients are all negative 
and all but one significant.  A decrease of one owner appears to increase the average number of 
topics per paper by about 0.3 beats or roughly 3%.  The estimates using owner-equivalents are 
somewhat larger, with a reduction of one owner-equivalent leading to an increase in variety per 
paper by about 2 beats per paper or about 10%.  Concentration appears to lead to more efficient 
production of variety. 
Taken together, these results suggest that although increased ownership concentration 
reduces the number of papers in a market, the increase in concentration leads to greater 
separation among papers.  Moreover, concentration appears to increase total content variety, 
providing stronger evidence that newspaper consolidation can benefit readers.  
5.2 Ownership Concentration and Readership 
This section asks whether the additional variety generated from consolidation increases 
readership.  Figure 5 shows the relationship between per capita newspaper sales and total content 
variety for 1995 and 1999 using zip code-level circulation data from ABC aggregated to the 
market level.36  The relationship appears positive, suggesting that additional content can attract 
                                                 
36 Readership data are available for 1995 and 1999 only and are incomplete in some markets.  Incomplete 
markets are excluded from the sample.   
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Table 7:  Does Ownership Concentration Increase Average Variety per Paper? 
 Number of Reporting Beats Covered per Paper, 1993-1999 
 All Beats Consolidated Beats 
 FE FE IV Pop IV Retail FE FE IV Pop IV Retail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Owners -0.324  -0.799 -1.288 -0.150  -0.404 -0.857 
 (2.54)*  (3.52)** (3.11)** (1.35)  (2.10)* (2.49)* 
Owner-equivalents  -2.177    -1.518   
  (4.17)**    (4.18)**   
Constant 8.866 19.114 -0.277 -0.551 7.033 15.529 -0.331 -0.585 
 (11.76)** (13.54)** (1.18) (1.75) (10.75)** (15.82)** (1.66) (2.23)* 
DMA’s 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses (*p<.05, **p<.01).  Regressions show average beats per paper on owners, owner-equivalents, and papers.  Constants in FE 
regressions represent the average value of the DMA fixed effect.  IV regressions predict changes in owners with population and retail-equivalents (levels).  
Constants in IV regressions show average change in the independent variable. 
 
 
 -30- 
readers to a market.  Table 8 shows the relationship between changes in the number of beats 
covered in a market and changes in per capita newspaper sales.  As expected, the effect is 
positive for both the total beat set and for consolidated beats, although coverage of 10 additional 
beats in a market appears to increase newspaper sales per capita by only 0.003, a small effect.  
The regressions in Table 9 estimate the effect of changes in the number of owners and owner-
equivalents over time on readership directly.  As above, the relationship is estimated with market 
fixed effects and instrumental variables.  The effect of an increase in owners is always negative 
but significant in only two cases.  The coefficient is small, with the loss of one owner raising 
total per capita circulation by 0.002-0.009 or about 1-5%.  Although these results provide only 
limited evidence that increases in ownership concentration increase readership, there appears to 
be no evidence that ownership concentration reduces readership.  Taken together, the results in 
this section suggest that the new content which emerges from consolidation does not reduce 
demand for newspapers.  
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Figure 5:  Per Capita Newspaper Sales and Number of Beats Covered; 1995, 1999 
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Table 8:  Does Content Variety Increase Readership? 
 Per Capita Newspaper Sales, 1995-1999 
 All Beats Consolidated Beats 
 FE FE 
 (1) (2) 
D Total Beats Covered 0.0003 0.0003 
 (1.98)* (2.11)* 
Constant -0.0041 -0.0037 
 (3.12)** (2.87)** 
Observations 196 196 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses (*p<.05, **p<.01).  Readership data from ABC.  Excludes the following 11 
markets with incomplete data:  Birmingham-Anniston, AL;  Dallas-Fort Worth, TX; Jonesboro, AR;  Joplin-
Pittsburg, MO-KS; Knoxville, TN; Los Angeles, CA; Nashville, TN; New York, NY; Oklahoma City, OK; Tulsa, 
OK; and Juneau, AK. 
 
 
Table 9:  Does Ownership Concentration Increase Readership? 
 Per Capita Newspaper Sales, 1995-1999 
 FE FE FE FE IV Pop 
IV 
Retail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Owners -0.0024  -0.0023  -0.0090 -0.0045 
 (1.98)*  (1.44)  (3.72)** (1.05) 
Owner-equivalents  -0.0033  -0.0038   
  (1.12)  (1.08)   
Papers   -0.0002    
   (0.14)    
Paper Equivalents    0.0011   
    (0.26)   
Constant 0.1879 0.1829 0.1890 0.1809 -0.0064 -0.0051 
 (27.28)** (23.98)** (18.50)** (16.54)** (4.22)** (2.79)** 
DMA’s 196 196 196 196 196 196 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses (*p<.05, **p<.01).  Readership data from ABC.  Excludes the following 11 
markets with incomplete data:  Birmingham-Anniston, AL;  Dallas-Fort Worth, TX; Jonesboro, AR;  Joplin-
Pittsburg, MO-KS; Knoxville, TN; Los Angeles, CA; Nashville, TN; New York, NY; Oklahoma City, OK; Tulsa, 
OK; and Juneau, AK. 
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6. Conclusion 
The analyses above demonstrate that increases in ownership concentration lead firms to 
differentiate products to a greater extent and cover a larger number of reporting beats.  
Moreover, this additional coverage may extend markets to new readers.  Since new readers that 
enter the market are better off, existing readers benefit from additional choice, and prices do not 
rise with concentration, consumers do not appear to be harmed by consolidation.  
With respect to current policy, results presented here suggest that government 
intervention to increase the number of media products and media owners within markets may be 
unnecessary.  To the extent that policy is concerned with aspects of diversity other than those 
associated with content variety, these results identify a benefit of concentration against which 
other potential costs should be weighed.37  However evidence in this paper challenges the notion 
that preserving multiple viewpoints necessarily makes consumers better off.  If redundant 
coverage is valuable, then loss of owners in a market should reduce total readership.  Since there 
is no evidence for readership decline, individuals do not appear to be made worse off by 
consolidation.  Arguments that ownership diversity generates external political and social 
benefits depend ultimately on consumption as well, hence the presence of externalities is not 
sufficient to justify intervention. 38  
                                                 
37 Advocates of strong media regulation often distinguish variety in content or programming from 
viewpoint diversity.  See, for example, the response to FCC’s Notice of Inquiry on the Commission’s 
Newspaper/Radio Cross-Ownership Waiver Policy by a coalition of minority interest groups, Comments Of Black 
Citizens For A Fair Media et al., MM Docket No. 96-197 dated February 7, 1997. 
38 Because it is not possible generally to measure infra-marginal utility, the potential for increases in 
ownership concentration to reduce total consumer surplus while increasing readership cannot be ruled out.  This 
might occur, for example, if new coverage replaces existing material from which certain types of consumers derive 
large benefits.  One way to check whether a particular group is harmed by concentration while others benefit is to 
regress changes in readership across race on changes in ownership concentration.  Ownership concentration does not 
appear to differentially affect readership among blacks relative to whites.  
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However despite evidence that ownership concentration has not harmed consumers, it is 
not possible to conclude from this research alone that current policies are misguided.  First, this 
paper only considers the effect of concentration on consumers.  Nothing can be said about 
aggregate welfare without taking into account how ownership concentration affects advertising 
prices, hence policies limiting consolidation may still be warranted when advertiser welfare is 
taken into account.  It also might be the case that increases in ownership concentration and 
coverage in newspaper markets in the 1990’s are related to heightened competition with radio 
and cable television over this period.  Although results in this paper are consistent with findings 
in the literature that ownership concentration in radio produces greater programming variety, 
little work has been done to directly examine competition across media and it remains an 
important area for further research.  
In sum, regulation of media markets in the U.S. and antitrust policy in particular presume 
that more owners and more products lead to greater content variety.  However the effect of 
concentration on variety in differentiated product markets is an empirical question that depends 
on fixed costs and the value of consumers to advertisers.  The analyses presented here suggest 
that concentration in newspaper markets does not, in fact, harm consumers.  Policies that prevent 
consolidation in media markets may thus be unwarranted.
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APPENDIX 
Table A1:  Number of Markets Covered by Beat, 1993 & 1999 (All Beats)      
  Beat 93 99   Beat 93 99 
 Administration 0 19  Conservation & Environment-Wildlife 0 1 
 Advertising 204 201  Consumer Interests-General 99 75 
 Advertising & Public Relations-General 0 29  Creative / Graphics 9 33 
 Aeronautics & Astronautics-Aviation 3 8  Criminology & Law Enforcement-General 0 24 
 Aeronautics & Astronautics-General 0 9  Disability & Physically Challenged-General 0 1 
 Agriculture-General 158 140  Drugs & Pharmaceuticals -General 0 1 
 Agriculture-Tobacco 0 1  Education-College & Post-Graduate 0 10 
 Apparel & Accessories-General 197 180  Education-General 179 168 
 Architecture-General 0 11  Electricity & Electronics-Consumer 0 6 
 Art & Sculpture-General 0 21  Electricity & Electronics-General 0 4 
 Automotive Industry-General 146 126  Energy-Trade 0 17 
 Automotive Industry-Motorcycle & Truck 0 1  Entertainment-General 196 196 
 Banking & Finance-Consumer Finance 0 27  Entertainment-Movies, Video, TV & Radio 148 164 
 Banking & Finance-General 155 116  Entertainment-Theater & Performing Arts 139 130 
 Beverage Industry-Wine & Wineries 0 5  Entertainment-TV/Radio Listing Guides 0 18 
 Building, Construction & Demolition-Trade 1 2  Ethnic & Multicultural-General 0 11 
 Business & Economy - Employment 0 14  Ethnic & Multicultural-Hispanic 0 3 
 Business & Economy -Retail 2 23  Finance 0 7 
 Business & Economy -Economic Conditions 0 18  Fitness, Health & Hygiene-General 121 130 
 Business & Economy -International Trade 0 11  Food & Grocery Trade 0 2 
 Business & Economy -Investments 0 21  Forestry-Lumber & Wood 0 1 
 Business & Economy -Management Pubs. 0 1  Gardening & Horticulture-Trade 108 101 
 Business & Economy -National 205 193  General Interest-Advice 0 1 
 Business & Economy -Non-Profits 0 1  General Interest-Bridal & Marriage 0 1 
 Business & Economy -Regional 0 11  General Interest-Children 74 65 
 Business & Economy -Small Business 0 25  General Interest-Dining & Cooking 199 195 
 Business & Economy -Taxation 0 2  General Interest-Gossip 0 1 
 Child Care & Child Development 115 96  General Interest-Home 164 156 
 Circulation 203 199  General Interest-National 204 205 
 Civil Engineering-General 0 1  General Interest-Regional & Local 0 28 
 Classified 184 172  General Interest-Singles & Dating 0 1 
 Collecting-Antiques 0 2  General Interest-Women 165 140 
 Collecting-Stamps & Currency 0 1  General Interest-Young Adult 1 3 
 Communications 0 2  Government & Politics-General 158 148 
 Communications-Broadcasting-Cable 0 4  Government & Politics-International 0 3 
 Communications-Broadcasting-Radio-TV 3 39  Government & Politics-Local & State 6 30 
 Communications-General 0 2  History & State History-General 0 3 
 Communications-Multimedia 0 2  Home Improvement-Home Furnishings 0 1 
 Communications-Telecommunications 0 10  Hospitals & Healthcare Management 0 14 
 Community Relations 2 8  Insurance-General 0 8 
 Computers & Computerization-General 98 99  Labor & Labor Unions-General 72 62 
 Computers & Computerization-Info. Mgt. 0 1  Law-Courts Reporter 0 22 
 Conservation & Environment-General 119 125  Law-General 88 88 
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Beat 93 99 Beat 93 99 
 Letters to the Editor 0 12  Religions & Theology-General 145 141 
 Librarian / Research 1 13  Restaurant & Hotel Management-General 0 2 
 Literature-Book Reviews 177 167  Sales 9 22 
 Literature-General 0 1  Sciences-Archaeology 0 1 
 Literature-Humor & Satire 0 7  Sciences-Astrology & Parapsychology 0 1 
 Management 206 207  Sciences-Astronomy  0 2 
 Manufacturing, Machinery & Equipment 0 16  Sciences-General 127 105 
 Mass Transportation & Shipping-General 58 46  Sciences-Meteorology 0 1 
 Mass Transportation & Shipping-Railroads 0 2  Senior Citizens-General 0 6 
 Letters to the Editor 0 12  Social Sciences & Sociology-General 0 8 
 Media Relations 0 3  Social Service & Welfare-Counseling 0 1 
 Medicine-AIDS/HIV 0 1  Social Service & Welfare-General 0 5 
 Medicine-General 146 140  Social Service & Welfare-Subst. Abuse 0 1 
 Medicine-Psychology 0 1  Sports-Auto Racing 0 7 
 Meetings & Conventions-General 0 1  Sports-Baseball 0 5 
 Military & Defense Industry-General 0 9  Sports-Bicycling 0 1 
 Music-Classical, Choral & B& Music 9 30  Sports-Boats & Boating 0 2 
 Music-Country, Folk & Bluegrass Music 0 1  Sports-Bowling 0 2 
 Music-General 129 127  Sports-General 205 226 
 Music-Jazz & Blues 1 4  Sports-Golf 0 27 
 Music-R & B, Urban, World & Latin Music 0 1  Sports-Horses & Horsemanship 0 10 
 Music-Rock Music 10 33  Sports-Ice Skating & Hockey 0 5 
 New Media 0 31  Sports-Skiing & Snow Sports 0 1 
 News-Foreign 62 48  Sports-Soccer & Rugby 0 3 
 News-General 182 207  Sports-Sports Industry & Business 0 6 
 News-Local 2 38  Sports-Sports Teams  0 17 
 News-National 74 86  Sports-Tennis & Racquet Sports 0 8 
 News-Regional 192 187  Sports-Track & Field, Gymnastics 0 2 
 Operations 1 15  Technology-General 113 84 
 Opinion & Commentary 199 196  Travel Industry-Consumer 181 175 
 Pets-Dogs 0 1  Women's Specialty & Feminist-General 0 2 
 Photo 174 169    
 Polls  0 3    
 Printing & Graphic Arts-General 0 1    
 Product Development 0 2    
 Production 37 23    
 Promotion / Marketing 33 54    
 Publishing-Newspaper Publishing & Journalism 0 2    
 Real Estate-General 154 142    
 Recreation, Leisure & Amusement-Consumer 0 2    
 Recreation, Leisure & Amusement-Gambling 0 3    
 Recreation, Leisure & Amusement-Outdoor 181 171    
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Table A2:  Retail Summary Statistics, 1997 Economic Census  
Retail Category NAICS Code Mean Stores (DMA) Mean Sales (000) 
Furniture  44211 20.50 33,544 
Floor covering  44221 24.01 31,511 
Other home furnishings  44229 26.42 27,465 
Appliance, TV, Electronics 44311 22.60 51,414 
Computer and software  44312 12.44 56,713 
Camera and photographic supplies  44313 6.38 11,072 
Home centers 44411 5.02 153,889 
Paint and wallpaper  44412 14.31 24,152 
Hardware  44413 19.65 27,373 
Other building material dealers 44419 27.20 89,233 
Outdoor power equipment  44421 7.37 10,012 
Nursery and garden centers 44422 7.13 17,309 
Supermarkets 44511 69.92 399,043 
Convenience  44512 52.28 36,240 
Pharmacies and drug  44611 66.43 180,486 
Cosmetics, beauty, perfume 44612 12.26 9,003 
Optical goods  44613 29.95 14,938 
Other health and personal care  44619 22.05 16,910 
Men's clothing  44811 25.93 27,482 
Women's clothing  44812 88.41 74,818 
Children's and infants' clothing  44813 10.38 18,011 
Family clothing  44814 30.37 86,698 
Clothing accessories  44815 12.48 8,498 
Other clothing  44819 18.92 15,439 
Shoe  44821 58.15 44,271 
Jewelry  44831 50.08 48,213 
Luggage and leather goods  44832 4.88 8,823 
Sporting goods  45111 38.96 41,201 
Hobby, toy, and game  45112 18.78 34,701 
Sewing, needlework, and piece goods 45113 10.23 10,080 
Musical instrument and supplies  45114 7.95 13,935 
Book and news dealers 45121 18.73 29,890 
Prerecorded tape, CD and records 45122 14.99 19,499 
Department Stores 45211 17.84 459,330 
Warehouse clubs  45291 3.22 347,130 
All other general merchandise  45299 11.50 8,156 
Florists 45311 40.13 12,400 
Office supplies and stationery  45321 6.65 37,262 
Gift, novelty, and souvenir  45322 56.61 28,100 
Used merchandise  45331 22.30 10,020 
Pet and pet supplies  45391 13.25 13,223 
Art dealers 45392 10.49 10,885 
Manufactured (mobile) home dealers 45393 5.40 18,909 
All other miscellaneous store retailers 45399 15.58 22,634 
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